2011: Big Tech Still Felt Like A School
· 22 min read · Views --

2011: Big Tech Still Felt Like A School

Author: Alex Xiang


I am an old-school programmer. After leaving big tech I have spent my time in startups, and I am still doing hands-on AI-related development. This column will slowly trace the changes in IT from the 1990s to today, with some personal memories mixed in. I publish fuller updates on the WeChat account “字与码”; if these recollections and observations are useful to you, feel free to follow there.

Baidu in 2011 had a very particular feeling in my memory: it was already large, but it had not yet become fully heavy.

That is, of course, subjective. Every large company has complicated sides, and no company runs only on technical ideals. But from an engineer’s point of view, Baidu at that time really did feel like a large engineering school.

You could see systems large enough to matter, run into problems real enough to teach you, and work around enough people who were willing to talk seriously about technology. For a programmer, that environment was rare.

Large Traffic Is An Education

Engineers often grow fastest not by reading more books, but by being educated by real systems.

Small systems have hard problems too, but large traffic amplifies everything: an inefficient loop becomes machine cost, an occasional error becomes a large number of failed users, a careless release can affect an entire business line, and a poorly designed log field can make later diagnosis painful.

Search was especially like this.

Search is not a single feature. It is a long chain: crawling, indexing, retrieval, ranking, snippets, anti-spam, ads, frontend display, log feedback, and effect evaluation. Any link can go deep, and any link can drag down the overall experience.

Working inside such a system naturally teaches one thing: engineering is not finishing code; it is making code withstand pressure in the real world for a long time.

Platform engineering culture

That is also something I later cared about when evaluating engineers: whether they had experienced systems under real pressure. Not just writing “high concurrency” on a resume, but actually understanding capacity, latency, degradation, rollback, monitoring, gray release, data quality, and incident review.

Technical Groups And Experience Passed By Word Of Mouth

In the previous article I wrote about Baidu Hi’s technical groups. By 2011, that kind of internal technical exchange had an even clearer influence on me.

Many engineering lessons are not taught well by standard tutorials. Why did an online service suddenly jitter? Why should a certain kind of log not be printed that way? Why must a script have safeguards before release? Why does a certain class of data look normal but contain bias?

These lessons often spread through discussion.

One person asked a question in a group. Another said they had stepped into the same pit before. A third filled in the historical reason. A fourth pasted a tool link. The problem was solved, and the people silently reading along learned too.

That is the value of an internal knowledge network.

Later, many companies liked building knowledge bases, but a knowledge base is only the result. What really matters is whether an organization has active knowledge flow. Without flow, documents become a warehouse. With flow, even an IM group can become part of engineering culture.

”Whampoa Military Academy” Was Not Just A Pretty Phrase

Many people called that generation of Baidu the Whampoa Military Academy of the internet.

That does not mean Baidu was perfect, or that everyone there became an expert. It means that, during those years, a large number of engineers were trained on large-scale internet systems at Baidu and then moved into many different companies: startups, other big tech companies, mobile internet, data platforms, advertising systems, and AI companies.

When an industry grows quickly, a few places must take on the role of talent training grounds.

Baidu had the conditions then. It had search traffic, commercialization systems, technical accumulation, sufficiently complex problems, and many smart people. A programmer who spent a few years in that environment would absorb many things almost unconsciously: how to build online services, how to process data, how to evaluate effects, and how to collaborate with product, algorithm, and operations teams.

Those abilities later became very useful in mobile internet and data-driven businesses.

The High Point Already Contained Later Problems

Of course, a high point can also bury future problems.

When a company grows quickly and has a strong position, path dependence easily forms inside it. Methods that worked in the past are assumed to keep working in the future. A profitable existing business makes investment in new directions more hesitant. The larger the organization, the higher the cost of cross-department collaboration.

This is not the problem of one company. It is a common problem for platform companies.

In 2011 I did not feel these problems very strongly yet. I saw more technical opportunity and engineering atmosphere. But after leaving Baidu, joining Weibo, and later looking back, it became clearer: the most valuable thing about big tech is that it trains people; the most dangerous thing is that it can make people mistakenly believe the world will always run at big-tech rhythm.

The next year, I would leave Baidu and join Weibo. Weibo was then sprinting toward its IPO, and the wave of mobile internet would hit me more directly.

IT Events Of 2011

  • The mobile ecosystem kept accelerating. The iOS and Android ecosystems expanded quickly, and smartphone apps moved from novelty features into everyday entry points. Clients, servers, and data platforms became more tightly coupled.
  • Baidu was still in a high-growth stage. Baidu’s revenue in the second quarter of 2011 grew by more than 70% year over year. Chinese-language search, advertising, and large-scale online services were still in their golden years, making big internet companies important training grounds for engineering talent.
  • Zhihu officially launched. Zhihu focused on Q&A and long-form content, filling a more knowledge-oriented space in the Chinese internet. It had a different product temperament from Weibo’s feed and forum-style communities.
  • Kuaishou was founded. Kuaishou started from GIF and tool attributes, and later turned toward short video and live-streaming communities. It would become an important player in the short-video era and foreshadow how content production tools and community platforms would keep blending.
  • Big tech became a talent hub. Search, advertising, data, and infrastructure capabilities flowed from large companies into startups, mobile internet, and data platforms. That generation of internet engineers later spread into many new platforms.
  • Mobile reshaped engineering requirements. Mobile networks, push notifications, client versions, API stability, and user behavior collection meant internet engineering no longer revolved only around web pages and PC entry points.

References